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ARTICLE

A PROGRESSIVE REPLY TO PROFESSOR
OPPENHEIMER ON PROPOSITION 209
Martin D. Carcieri*

I. INTRODUCTION

In the Spring 1999 issue of the Santa Clara Law Review,
law professor and ACLU board member David Oppenheimer
published a response1 to an article I published in the same
journal a few months earlier.2 My previous article elaborated
three justifications for the United States Supreme Court's refusal to review the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' ruling in
Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson.3 There, the Ninth
Circuit upheld California's Proposition 209' against an equal
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of North Florida;
Adjunct Professor, Florida Coastal School of Law. J.D., Ph.D., University of
California. The author wishes to thank University of North Florida's General
Counsel Karen Stone, Esq. and Professors Tom Schrock and Edward Erler for
their useful comments on earlier drafts of this article. The views expressed
herein are the author's own.
1. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Carcieri's Self-Described "Progressive" Critique of the ACLU on Proposition 209: A "Conservative" Response, 39
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1153 (1999).
2. See Martin D. Carcieri, A ProgressiveReply to the ACLU on Proposition
209, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 141 (1998) [hereinafter Carcieri, A Progressive
Reply].
3. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 110 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 533 U.S. 963 (1997).
4. Proposition 209 is now Article I, section 31 of the California Constitution. Subdivision (a), the central focus of controversy, provides that "the state
shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the
operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting." CAL.
CONST. art I, § 31(a). The voters of the State of Washington followed California's lead in passing an identical initiative, and similar efforts have been
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protection attack by the ACLU and other groups.' The editors
of the Santa Clara Law Review have courteously allowed me
to respond.
This article poses two basic responses to Professor Oppenheimer's article. First, he fails to respond to the bulk of
my arguments. Part II of this article identifies a number of
evasions and fallacies in which Professor Oppenheimer engages. Second, even when he attempts to respond to my arguments, he often distorts them as well as the effectiveness of
his own arguments. Part III of this article identifies and responds to a number of particular points he raises.
Professor Oppenheimer does make some valid points and
recognizes that we are in partial agreement on a number of
specific issues. In a debate as contentious as affirmative action, it is important to underscore such common ground. Not
only can this common ground clarify the debate's central issues, but it also provides a starting point for constructive
dialogue and the forging of policy consensus. Part IV of this
article elaborates on the areas of agreement.
Professor Oppenheimer fails to mention that I was a
member of, and contributed to, the ACLU for years.6 As a liberal and progressive, I still support its positions on many issues. Yet, as Professor Oppenheimer also fails to mention,
one of my prime targets in A Progressive Reply was an article
by Southern California ACLU Executive Director Ramona
Ripston in the ACLU's official publication.7 Reading Ms. Ripston's article served, to use an old phrase, to "waken me from
my dogmatic slumbers" on the constitutional legitimacy of
public affirmative action. I encourage all those unfamiliar
with the ACLU's public stance on Proposition 209 (including
Professor Oppenheimer) to read Ripston's article. Further,
readers should consult not only Professor Oppenheimer's arti-

launched elsewhere. See Mary MacDonald & Beth Kassab, Activist Seeks 2000
Ballot, FL. TIMES-UNION, Mar. 16, 1999, at Al; Peter Schmidt, Legislatures
Show Little Enthusiasm for Measure to End Race Preferences, CHRON. OF
HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 13, 1998, at A44; Sam Verhovek & B. Drummond Ayres,
Voters Back End to State Preferences, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1998, at B2b.
5. See Coalitionfor Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 692.
6. See Carcieri, A ProgressiveReply, supra note 2, at 181 n.165. See, e.g.,
Martin D. Carcieri, Free Speech: ACLU is Right, FL. TIMES-UNION, Oct. 31,
1999, at C2.
7. See Rowena Ripston, Why We Don't Live in a "Mob-ocracy", 71 ACLU
OPEN FORUM 1 (1997).
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cle, to which I reply here, but also my original article, A Progressive Reply, as well.8

II. THE INDIVIDUALIST PRINCIPLE AND PROFESSOR
OPPENHEIMER'S FALLACIES

A.

The Role of the IndividualistPrinciple in Equal
ProtectionJurisprudence

Professor Oppenheimer claims that A Progressive Reply
distorts the ACLU's position.9 In challenging Proposition 209,
the ACLU claimed that a ban on the use of race and gender
preferences in the operation of public education, employment,
and contracting violates equal protection." To violate the
Equal Protection Clause, however, women and minorities
must be constitutionally entitled to preferences in the distribution of those public benefits. Otherwise, there is no basis
for the claim that California voters violated the clause by
ending the preferences. In defending the ACLU's position,
Professor Oppenheimer assumes that the Equal Protection
Clause provides for two tiers of citizens, distinguished solely
by immutable traits of race and gender: those preferred and
those not preferred in the allocation of public benefits. This
assumption raises the question of how to square this claim
with the text of the Constitution that provides that no state
shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."" The Equal Protection Clause was part
of an attempt to destroy, not perpetuate, a system of differential treatment by the government based on race. 2 Interpreting this clause as allowing or, in the ACLU's opinion, compelling the government to treat individuals differently based on

8. See Oppenheimer, supra note 1; Carcieri; A Progressive Reply, supra
note 2. While I disagree with Professor Oppenheimer's response, I must say at
the outset that I consider his article a high, if indirect, compliment. As a busy,
intelligent man, he would never have wasted the time to write a 30-page response to an article he truly thought was so weak as to have little chance of persuading anyone who does not already agree.
9. See Oppenheimer, supra note 1, at 1153.
10. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1489 (N.D.
Cal. 1996).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (emphasis added).
12. See GEOFFREY STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 506-07 (3d ed.

1996).
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race or gender renders that provision, by definition, a vehicle
of inequality. 3
By creating two tiers of citizens, Professor Oppenheimer
ignores the individualist principle. The United States Supreme Court has long upheld the principle that the government may not constitutionally punish or otherwise deprive an
individual of rights based on his or her racial group membership. 4 Perhaps the most powerful case standing for this principle is one of the Court's most infamous. In Korematsu v.
United States,5 a civilian exclusion order under which all
Americans of Japanese ancestry in certain west coast military
areas were removed to internment camps was challenged on
constitutional grounds. The government argued that because
of the war with Japan and its belief that at least some Japanese-Americans were engaged in espionage and sabotage, the
exclusion order was a military necessity. 6 The Supreme
Court upheld the order against constitutional attack. In so
doing, Justice Black implicitly held that a compelling state
interest sometimes justifies overtly racist means, and that
due process and equal protection may be sacrificed in favor of
such an interest.
Though it took over forty years, the United States government finally made reparations to the survivors of the internment camps, and Korematsu is now generally classed
with Dred Scott v. Sandford8 and Plessy v. Ferguson" as one
of the Court's great mistakes. ° On that account, the views of
the two dissenting Justices in Korematsu have particular
authority. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Murphy wrote,
"under our system of law, individual guilt is the sole basis for
deprivation of rights." " In his separate dissent, Justice Jack13. Further, since we are in the realm of state rather than federal law, section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, giving Congress remedial power to enforce
section 1 of that amendment, is irrelevant.
14. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) (invalidating the judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants on property ownership based on
race).
15. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
16. See id. 216-17.
17. See id. at 217-18.
18. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
19. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
20. See WILLIAM COHEN & DAVID DANELSKI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CIVIL
LIBERTY AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 968 (4th ed. 1997).

21. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 240 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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son added, "if any fundamental assumption underlies our sys22 The
tem, it is that guilt is personal and not inheritable."
American political culture has come to reject Justice Black's
ruling and embrace the dissenting opinions. 23 Thus, the unequal treatment of individuals by the government based on
physical characteristics is barely permissible under the Constitution, much less compelled.2 4
Another pivotal case underscoring the central role of the
individualist principle in Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence is University of California Regents v. Bakke.25 That
case involved an equal protection challenge to the University
of California, Davis Medical School practice of setting aside
up to sixteen seats in every entering class of 100 solely for
members of certain racial or ethnic minorities. In his controlling opinion, Justice Lewis Powell struck down the quota
system yet allowed the use of race or ethnicity as one of many
factors in the admissions process on the ground that the promotion of diversity among public university student bodies is
a compelling state interest.26 What is often overlooked by
those who embrace the diversity rationale applied in Bakke is
that Justice Powell was consistent in his liberalism. In
Bakke, he argued that individual human beings, not groups of
human beings, are the fundamental locus of equal protection.
Justice Powell wrote:
It is settled beyond question that the rights created by the
first section of the Fourteenth Amendment are ... guaranteed to the individual. The rights established are perFairness in individual competition for
sonal rights ....
opportunities, especially those provided by the State, is a
widely cherished American ethic. Indeed, in a broader
sense, an underlying assumption of the rule of law is the
worthiness of a system of justice based on fairness to the
individual.27
22. Id. at 243 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
23. The fact that Congress appropriated reparations to the internment
camp survivors is evidence of this. See Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C.
app. § 1989b-4.
24. As Judge O'Scannlain wrote for the Ninth Circuit panel that upheld
Proposition 209 against equal protection attack, "[tihe Fourteenth Amendment,
lest we lose the forest for the trees, does not require what it barely permits."
Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 110 F.3d 1431, 1446 (9th Cir. 1997).
25. University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
26. See id.
27. Id. at 289, 319 n.53.
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Beyond his well-known incisive analysis of the logical
and political implications of departures from the individualist
principle,28 Powell emphasized that it is a universal principle,
rooted in our common citizenship and humanity.29 The individualist principle is the anchor of equal protection analysis,
the starting point from which departures must be justified,
and is reflected in the fact that racial classifications by the
government are subject to strict scrutiny." Powell expressed
that "[wihen a State's distribution of benefits or imposition of
burdens hinges on ancestry or the color of a person's skin,
that individual is entitled to a demonstration that the challenged classification is necessary to promote a substantial
state interest.'
While Justice Powell alone recognized the diversity principle in Bakke, the unanimous Court embraced the principle
that the individual is the locus of Fourteenth Amendment
protection. 2 While the "Stevens Four" posture on this point is
not surprising,33 Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun
added:
Race, like gender and illegitimacy, is an immutable characteristic which its possessors are powerless to escape or
set aside. While such a classification is not per se invalid... it is nevertheless true that such divisions are contrary to our deep belief that legal burdens should bear
some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing .... Because this principle is so deeply rooted it

might be supposed that it would be considered in the leg-

28. See id. at 291-99.
29. See id. at 292-93; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886); see also
PAUL SNIDERMAN & EDWARD G. CARMINES, REACHING BEYOND RACE 8 (1997).
Thus, while some affirmative action proponents defend affirmative action on
grounds of inclusion, see, e.g., DEREK BOK & WILLIAM BOWEN, THE SHAPE OF
THE RIVER 285 (1998); CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, NOT ALL BLACK AND WHITE 124

(1996), it is the individualist principle, not race and gender preferences, that is
truly inclusive.
30. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
31. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320.
32. See id. at 413-14.
33. Though the individualist principle is at the heart of classical liberalism,
it is also embraced by contemporary conservatives. See id. (Stevens, Burger,
Stewart, and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting in part). While the "Stevens Four" disposed of the case on statutory grounds, both Title VI and the Equal Protection
Clause protect "persons," and even Professor Edley concedes that the standard
for Title VI cases is the same as under the Equal Protection Clause. See EDLEY,
supra note 29, at 69; see also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 287.
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islative process and weighed against benefits of programs
preferring individuals because of their race. But this is
not necessarily so: The natural consequence of our governing process may well be that the most discrete and insular of whites will be called upon to bear the immediate,
direct costs of benign discrimination .... Thus, even if the
concern for individualism is weighed by the political process, that weighing can not waive the personal
34 rights of inAmendment.
Fourteenth
the
under
dividuals

Since its decision in Bakke, the Court has continued to
enunciate the individualist principle." For example, Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy, on whose views affirmative action
proponents stake their case," began their dissent in Metro
Broadcasting v. FCC37 by stressing that the individual is the
starting point of equal protection analysis.38 Justice Thomas,
who has since joined the Court, would almost certainly
agree.3 9 Again, the individualist principle does not always
prevail in an equal protection challenge; rather, it is the anchor of the analysis from which departures must be justified.
Professor Oppenheimer's initial response to this discussion might be compared to Justice Blackmun's famous assertion that "[i]n order to get beyond racism, we must first take
account of race."4 However, there are at least two responses
to this lofty claim. First, it implicitly confuses the importance
34. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 360-61 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun,
JJ., dissenting in part) (emphasis added). It can hardly be surprising that the
Bakke Court unanimously underscored the individualist principle. To be sure,
the members of that Court had lived through the Civil Rights Era, and so recalled the days of de jure racial segregation in the American South. Yet they
had also lived through World War II and the early Cold War. Thus, they also
remembered the Nazi concentration camps, the Soviet gulags, and the internment camps in the American West. They vividly recalled what can happen under collectivist regimes, such as socialism and fascism, when the individual human being is not the locus of civil rights.
35. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 265, 281 n.8 (1986); see
also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
36. See Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke's Fate, 43 UCLA L.
REV. 1745 (1996); Ronald Dworkin, Is Affirmative Action Doomed?, N.Y. REVIEW
OF BOoKS, Nov. 5, 1998, at 56; Jeffrey Rosen, The Day the Quotas Died, NEW
REPUBLIC, Apr. 22, 1996, at 21.
37. Metro Broad. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
38. See id. at 602 (O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
39. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring).
40. University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part).
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of the goal with the validity of the means used to achieve it.
That a goal is important does not establish the validity of any
means to achieve it. As Dr. Martin Luther King once wrote,
"the means we use must be as pure as the ends we seek.' '
Not only is such an "ends justify the means" position illiberal
and antidemocratic, it also begs the very question of what it
means to take race into account. Affirmative action is embodied in a variety of ends, means, and contexts, and there
are conflicting legitimate and compelling interests at stake in
its constitutional resolution. Justice Blackmun's assertion is
thus the beginning, not the end, of the conversation.
Second, and more basically, the California electorate
simply disagreed with Justice Blackmun. It apparently believed that "one gets beyond racism by getting beyond it now:
by a complete, resolute, and credible commitment never to
tolerate in one's own life-or in the life or practices of one's
government-the differential treatment of other human beings by race. "" In a democracy, the people's judgment must
by definition be entitled to a presumption of validity.
B.

ProfessorOppenheimer'sFallacies
Professor Oppenheimer's fallacies include the following:
(1) mistaken assumptions regarding compelling state interests; (2) fallacy of division; (3) fallacy of distribution;
(4) confusion of minority interests with minority rights;
(5) equivocation of discrimination with the denial of preferences; and (6) mistaken relevance of laws forbidding discrimination against veterans, the aged, and the disabled.
1. Mistaken Assumptions Regarding Compelling State
Interests
Professor Oppenheimer appears to concede that the individual is the locus of equal protection. He writes that "individuals have constitutional rights when they are denied equal
opportunity based on their group membership."4 He contin41. Martin Luther King, Letter from Birmingham Jail, in THE DEMOCRACY
READER: CLASSIC AND MODERN SPEECHES, ESSAYS, POEMS, DECLARATIONS,
AND DOCUMENTS ON FREEDOM AND HUMAN RIGHTS WORLDWIDE 197 (Diane

Ravitch & Abigail Thernstrom eds., 1992).
42. William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage:Race, the Supreme Court, and the
Constitution,46 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 809-10 (1979).

43. Oppenheimer, supra note 1, at 1154.
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ues, "the Supreme Court recognizes that individuals are often
mistreated because of their group identity."" However, these
passages only refer to those individuals who are members of
the race and gender groups that Professor Oppenheimer
claims are constitutionallyentitled to preferences.45 Professor
Oppenheimer never refers to the individual as such as the locus of equal protection. Doing so would effectively concede
that there are not two tiers of protection based on race and
gender under the equal protection clause. It would be an admission that even individuals like Alan Bakke" and Cheryl
Hopwood" are sometimes mistreated "based on their group
membership," and "because of their group identity." Such a
concession seriously weakens Professor Oppenheimer's argument. 8
It might still be objected that while "any person" may
bring an equal protection challenge, the challenge is always
to a group-based classification. Since the government legitimately and unavoidably classifies based on group characteristics all the time-such as prohibiting the blind from obtaining
drivers licenses-the real question is simply whether that
For example, assuming
classification is constitutional.
standing, "any person" may challenge a state law prohibiting
the legally blind from obtaining drivers' licenses. The state,
however, has a legitimate and in fact compelling interest in
classifying individuals in this fashion, namely, protecting
public safety against the danger posed by a legally blind
driver. At the same time, the State may not deprive an individual of a license because he looks like someone who is blind.
44. Id. at 1161.
45. See id. Professors Lawrence and Matsuda make a similar move in their
assertion that "when an individual's rights are denied because her group is
subjugated, only remedies creating equality for the group can offer true equality
for the individual." CHARLES LAWRENCE & MARY MATSUDA, WE WON'T Go
BACK: MAKING THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 81 (1997).

46. See University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
47. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
48. In his ambiguity with key terminology, Professor Oppenheimer is at
least consistent. In an op-ed article last year, he did the same thing, simply assuming that the American founders' concerns and the meaning of American
democracy are exhausted by the "Madisonian dilemma" of majority rule versus
majority rights. See David Oppenheimer, King's "Letterfrom Birmingham Jail"
and Affirmative Action, S.F. EXAMINER, Apr. 10, 1998, at A21. In fact, Madison
argued that the biggest threat to individual liberty is faction, whether majority
or minority. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 82-84 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
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The individual person must pose the threat against which the
state may legitimately guard. If, and only if, the state demonstrates that the individual challenging the law is legally
blind, thus posing the threat that the state may guard
against, there is no equal protection violation. The individual
locus of equal protection does not render such a classification
unconstitutional.
In contrast to classifications based on ordinary police
power concerns, however, race-based classifications are presumptively disfavored from the constitutional viewpoint, as
reflected by the requirement to apply strict scrutiny to all
such classifications.4 9 Not only do "racial characteristics so
seldom provide a relevant basis for disparate treatment [and
not only are] classifications based on race ... potentially so
harmful to the entire body politic,"5 ° but there is no such thing
as "benign" discrimination.5 1 Therefore, any such classification must be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state
interest.
Consequently, one of the greatest weaknesses in Professor Oppenheimer's position is that he fails to answer the following question: What is the compelling state interest for the
race-based classification at the heart of the public affirmative
action scheme banned by Proposition 209? Professor Oppenheimer assumes two compelling state interests for affirmative
action under equal protection analysis: (1) remedying general
societal discrimination, and (2) achieving proportional representation of his favored groups within certain categories of
employment. Supporting these assumptions, Professor Oppenheimer cites Bureau of Labor statistics indicating that
white males as a group have higher rates of employment than
other groups.52 However, he simply assumes, rather than
shows, the constitutional significance of these statistics.
Even assuming that the disparities suggested by the statistics are solely the result of general societal discrimination,
the Supreme Court has ruled for over twenty years that

49. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
50. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 533-34 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
51. See Metro Broad. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 609, 615 (O'Connor, Rehnquist,
Kennedy, and Scalia, JJ., dissenting); see also Adarand, 515 U.S. at 226; Bakke,
438 U.S. at 298.
52. See Oppenheimer, supra note 1, at 1170-71.
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remedying general societal discrimination is not a compelling
state interest. 53 Not only is this "an amorphous concept of
'
injury that may be ageless in its reach into the past," but it
violates the individualist principle. To the unemployed individual, after all, it is no consolation that people who look like
him are employed. For important, longstanding reasons,
thus, remedying general societal discrimination is an insufficient reason for applying race-based classifications.
Similarly, in citing "the fact that white males are disproportionately represented"55 in many sectors of public employment, Professor Oppenheimer implicitly assumes that this
disproportionate representation is the problem to be remedied.56 However, remedying disproportionate representations
is not even considered a compelling governmental interest in
public university admissions, where race preferences are relatively defensible. As Justice Powell wrote, the state interest
"is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified percentage of the student body is in effect guaranteed to
be members of selected ethnic groups." 7
53. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509 (1989);
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986); Bakke, 438 U.S. at
309. While Professor Oppenheimer notes my agreement that remedying identified discrimination is a compelling state interest, he neglects to mention that I
identify it as a middle ground, a "centrist compromise" between the conflicting
interests in remedying discrimination and according equal protection to each
individual. See Carcieri, A ProgressiveReply, supra note 2, at 174. By simply
assuming that remedying general societal discrimination is a compelling state
interest, Professor Oppenheimer excuses himself from responding to whether
my characterization of the rule of identified discrimination is valid.
54. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307; see also Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 614.
55. Oppenheimer, supra note 1, at 1170.
56. See id. at 1169-77.
57. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315. Moreover, Justice O'Connor has expressly rejected proportional representation as a compelling state interest. In rejecting
diversity as a compelling state interest, Justice O'Connor has noted that this
justification "might be used to justify equally unconstrained racial preferences,
linked to nothing other than proportional representation of various races."
Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 614 (O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ.,
dissenting); see also Croson, 488 U.S. at 507-08 (rejecting "outright racial balancing"). Beyond this, even assuming that proportional representation were a
compelling state interest, Professor Oppenheimer does not speak to the other
side of underrepresentation, namely overrepresentation. See Nathan Glazer,
Diversity Dilemma, NEW REPUBLIC, June 22, 1998, at 11. If even rough proportional representation were the constitutional command, it seems that we must
begin limiting the number of Jews and Asians at the University of California,
where they matriculate out of proportion to their percentage of the population.
Fortunately for those groups, that would be unconstitutional under Justice

1116

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

Thus, Professor Oppenheimer's first fallacy is that he
makes unjustified assumptions regarding the compelling
state interests justifying public affirmative action programs.
Specifically, simply citing statistics to demonstrate the need
to remedy societal discrimination runs directly contrary to
Supreme Court precedents holding such interests not compelling."
2. Fallacy of Division
As this discussion suggests, and as those who have read
A Progressive Reply will notice, Professor Oppenheimer engages in a fallacy that I identified and elaborated on at some
length,5 9 but to which he does not attempt to respond. This is
the fallacy of division. The fallacy of division is the assumption that what is true of the group is true of any individual
member of the group, or more precisely, that the relationship
existing between groups necessarily exists between individual
members of groups. While Professor Oppenheimer pays lip
service to the individualist principle, he only considers those
individuals who are members of the groups he deems entitled
to preferences under the Constitution. By systematically ignoring that every individual is fully protected under the
Equal Protection Clause, Professor Oppenheimer easily assumes that, even from a constitutional point of view, only
Powell's opinion in Bakke. Under proportional representation, further, we need
to fire a lot of black teachers in East Los Angeles high schools, for no other reason than their skin color, since they are represented out of proportion to their
percentage of the population of East Los Angeles. See Robert Harwood, Opportunity and the New Diversity, WASHINGTON POST, July 21, 1997, at A21.
Another problem here is that once proportional representation is implicitly
assumed to be a compelling state interest, achieving it becomes unthinkable
without the de facto quotas which were declared unconstitutional in Bakke. See
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316-19. See generally DARIEN MCWHIRTER, THE END OF
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE? 146-47 (1996).

58. Professor Oppenheimer's case against Proposition 209 based on the labor statistics he cites is even weaker than Justice Black's opinion in Korematsu.
As much violence as Justice Black did to the principle of individualized guilt, at
least he rested his decision on a compelling state interest, namely military necessity during time of war. Professor Oppenheimer not only ignores the individualist principle, turning the Equal Protection Clause inside out for short
term political gain, but he does not even do so in light of a recognized compelling state interest. As should be clear, I make no claim that anyone is entitled
to public benefits. Rather, every person is entitled to a fair chance to obtain
those benefits, without his immutable traits being used against him, absent a
showing that this is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest.
59. See Carcieri, A ProgressiveReply, supra note 2, at 154-59.
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groups and their relations, rather than individuals, are important. Professor Oppenheimer does not seem to acknowledge that the group is not the individual, nor the individual
the group.6" Professor Oppenheimer's premise that more of
the gender preferences are constitutionally required, such
that state voters cannot eliminate them, rests on the mistaken assumption that only group relationships, and not individual interests, are constitutionally relevant.
3. Fallacy of Redistribution
Professor Oppenheimer quotes my observation that "' [a]n
opportunity is a chance. Undergraduate admission to a good
university is thus fairly termed an opportunity and.., there
is some merit to the argument for race-based preferences in
that context.'6. The broader point in A Progressive Reply,
however, was that race-based preferences are generally not
constitutional in public employment. A Progressive Reply
continued, "[a] job is not an opportunity; it is not a chance at
the prize, it is the prize. The vast majority of people who are
not independently wealthy need to earn a living. That is
largely why they pursue an education." 2
In failing to discuss the broader point, Professor Oppenheimer, as well as other prominent members of the affirmative action establishment,6" engages in what may be called the
fallacy of redistribution. This is the assumption that since
some forms of public resource redistribution are constitutional, even if done in a race-conscious way, the same is true
of other such forms of redistribution. This assumption fails to
recognize that as shifting contexts change, the degree of offense to the individualist principle, and thus to equal protection, also shifts, given the concentration and degree of burdens worked by the redistribution on disfavored individuals.
60. Professor Troy Duster has also recently deployed the fallacy of division.
He writes, "the mere fact that one's group has accumulated wealth ten times
that of another group is rendered irrelevant by the legerdemain of invoking individual fairness." Troy Duster, Individual Fairness, Group Preferences, and
the California Strategy, in AFTER BAKKE, IN RACE AND REPRESENTATION:
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 111, 115 (Robert Post & Michael Rogin eds., 1998).
61. Oppenheimer, supra note 1, at 1179 n.152.

62. Carcieri,A ProgressiveReply, supra note 2, at 171 n.128.
63. See EDLEY, supra note 29, at 249-50; LAWRENCE & MATSUDA, supra
note 45, at 185, 253-56, 273, 277; Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative
Action for Whom?, 47 STAN. L. REV. 855, 863-64 (1995).
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To illustrate, there is nothing unconstitutional with the
redistribution of wealth through legislative taxing and
spending powers. This is so even if it disproportionately
benefits minorities, as when public revenues are allocated to
support inner city public schools. Not only is the burden of
such a plan distributed among all taxpayers, but it is consistent with the liberal value of equality of opportunity in that it
helps provide members of targeted groups the chance to develop their abilities to compete for seats at good universities.
The fallacy of redistribution emerges when it is simply
assumed that since some redistribution of public resources
based on race is defensible in the educational context, it is
also legitimate in public employment and contracting. In a
contracting or employment situation, another comparable opportunity is not always available.64 This is particularly true
in an era of widespread corporate downsizing, and especially
true in public university teaching where, Oppenheimer admits, there is a tight market.65 Further, the employment and
contracting contexts involve an individual's livelihood, not
simply the preparation for work. Therefore, the scope of the
denied liberty interest is much greater than in the educational context. In these situations, not only are the burdens
of race and gender preferences concentrated on a few individuals, but they are more severe than in the educational context. Thus notwithstanding the failure of Professor Oppenheimer and others to make these distinctions, not all contexts
of redistribution are created equal.
4. Confusing Minority Interests with Minority Rights
One of the major thrusts of A Progressive Reply was to
show that the Hunter/ Seattle" or "political structure" doctrine does not apply to invalidate Proposition 209.67 However,
Professor Oppenheimer insists that this doctrine has "clear
64. As Justice Powell has written, individuals dispreferred for public benefits based on their race "are likely to find little comfort in the notion that the
deprivation they are asked to endure is merely the price of membership in the
dominant majority and that its imposition is inspired by the supposedly benign
purpose of aiding others." Univesity of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 294
n. 34 (1978).
65. See Oppenheimer, supra note 1, at 1173.
66. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Washington v. Seattle Sch.
Dist. No.1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
67. See Carcieri, A ProgressiveReply, supra note 2, at 162-72.
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application" to Proposition 209.68
Professor Oppenheimer writes that the ACLU plaintiffs
"were individual women and minority group members who,
because of their group status, would lose governmental benefits [such as affirmative action programs] to which they were
entitled."69 The plaintiffs "were threatened with the loss of affirmative action programs that were available to them because they were members of one or more groups which were
entitled to such benefits."" Descriptively, these statements
are accurate. Before Proposition 209, the government's official practice was to use race and gender preferences in distributing public benefits. However, prescriptively,the issue is
whether women and minorities ought to be "entitled" to such
benefits. Professor Oppenheimer simply assumes that since
minorities and women have an interest in preferences, they
have a right to them.7 1 Whether women and minorities have
a right to preferences was the issue addressed by Proposition
209.72 The constitutional question faced by the appellate
court in Coalition for Economic Equality v. Wilson" was,
therefore, whether the voters' refusal to turn that interest
into a right violated equal protection.74
As a variation on this assumption, Professor Oppen5 case that "its
heimer writes of the initiative in the Seattle"
impact was felt only by the minority residents of Seattle who
had sought a busing remedy to improve their children's education." 6 This fact, however, proves nothing. No one denies
that Proposition 209 has a differential "impact" on women
and minorities, but that is barely the beginning, not the end
of the discussion.77 Many laws have a disproportionate im-

68. See Oppenheimer, supra note 1, at 1163.
69. Id. at 1162 (emphasis added).
70. Id. (emphasis added).
71. See Carcieri, A ProgressiveReply, supra note 1, 170-71 n.122-27.
72. See CAL. CONST. art. I § 31.
73. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
74. See id. at 1489.
75. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
76. Oppenheimer, supra note 1, at 1167 (emphasis added).
77. On a related topic, Professor Oppenheimer claims that I am "disingenuous" for being puzzled by the ACLU's arguments. See id. at 1163. Yet this
completely misconstrues my meaning. As I explained:
The ACLU ... argues that [Proposition 209] imposes "special burdens"
on women and people of color who wish to secure preferences. This is
puzzling, however, because a denial of equal protection must be a de-
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pact on recognizable groups of people. For example, the
driver's license law has a differential impact on the blind, but
this does not establish a violation of equal protection. Again,
for Proposition 209, the issue is whether women and minorities were constitutionally entitled to the preferences in the
first place. Professor Oppenheimer does not address this issue, but rather simply assumes that race and gender preferences are properly the status quo, from which departures
must be justified. Thus, by claiming that Proposition 209
raised the old issue of "when the white majority uses the
law ... to repress the rights of minorities,"78 Professor Oppenheimer mistakenly assumes that minorities and women
have a right to affirmative action.
5. EquatingDiscriminationwith the Denial of
Preferences
If confronted with the previous fallacy, Professor Oppenheimer might say that he is simply speaking of "the essential
right of minority group members to equal protection of the
law."79 Equal protection is a right, of course, but this response
simply shifts the question to that of the meaning of equal protection. With respect to Hunter, ° he writes, "the black residents of Akron ... had lost their legal protection from discrimination.""
However, Proposition 209 did not affect
women and minorities' protection from discrimination. It
only ended preferences for minorities and women. Yet Professor Oppenheimer simply equivocates the two. With respect to
nial of some benefit or imposition of some burden inapplicable to other
similarly situated individuals. Under [Proposition 2091, however, no
individual can secure a race preference in the allocation of public benefits without a constitutional amendment.
Carcieri, A ProgressiveReply, supra note 2, at 164.
78. Oppenheimer, supra note 1, at 1160 (emphasis added). He refers elsewhere to those occasions "when majorities deprive minorities of rights." Id. at
1154. It is noteworthy that though he fails to acknowledge it, Professor Oppenheimer is no longer arguing for gender preferences with such references, since
women constitute a majority of the population. Also, his claim that I "dismiss
the possibility of sex discrimination occurring in American life," id. at 1169, is
quite mistaken. Nowhere do I deny the existence of sex discrimination. Unlike
Professor Oppenheimer, I include within such discrimination the use of gender
preferences against males. I simply dispute that women are constitutionally
entitled to preferences.
79. Id. at 1160.
80. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
81. Oppenheimer, supra note 1, at 1166-67.
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Seattle, for example, he equates "those favoring the elimination of de facto segregation,"8 2 with those favoring the maintenance of race and gender preferences. Such an equation
negates the possibility of an evenhanded process by which
public benefits might be distributed, making "discrimination"
and "no preference" synonymous. If a matter is "racial in
character,"83 it does not matter whether the law imposes preferences or extends protection from discrimination.
This, however, is an untenable position. As stated in A
ProgressiveReply, there is a
crucial distinction between protection from discrimination
[or segregation] based on race, as in Hunter and Seattle,
and the denial of preferences based on race, as in [Proposition 209]. While both are "racial in character," a classification based on race and gender in order to bestow a preference can not simply be equated with declassification of
race and gender in order to eliminate the use of such preferences. One is the reverse of the other, and only [Proposition 209] functions to place individuals on an equal
footing. 4
6. Mistaking the Relevance of Laws Forbidding
DiscriminationAgainst Veterans, the Aged, and the
Disabled
Finally, Professor Oppenheimer claims that since veterans, the disabled, and the aged do not lose their "benefits" or
"programs" under Proposition 209, the measure denies
women and minorities equal protection because they lose
preferences based on their immutable traits.8" Professor Oppenheimer simply assumes that race and gender preferences
are for all intents and purposes the same as "benefits" or
"programs" for these other groups. Under California law,
however, these groups enjoy no general preference in the distribution of public benefits. The aged and disabled, with rare
exception, only enjoy protection from discrimination.8 6 While
veterans enjoy preferences in a few situations, as for positions
serving other veterans, two important distinctions exist.

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 1164.
Carcieri, A ProgressiveReply, supra note 2, at 167-70.
Id. at 168-69.
See Oppenheimer, supra note 1, at 1153, 1162.
See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12940(a)(1), 12941(a) (West 1992).
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First, veterans are not similarly situated with non-veterans
with respect to the reasonable qualifications for such positions, and thus such exceptions pose no equal protection difficulty. Second, these preferences are based on military service, rather than certain immutable traits, and thus are
fundamentally distinguishable from race and gender preferences. Veterans' preferences constitute a reasonable means
of encouraging people to enlist in the armed forces, and provide a reward for service, which is often life-threatening.
Beyond these considerations, as I wrote in A Progressive
Reply,
even if California law allowed age or disability preferences
in the allocation of public benefits generally, it would still
not justify race and gender preferences .... Allowing race
and gender preferences to exist just because other kinds of
preferences exist still allows many people to "fall through
the cracks." The individual remains unprotected. The
State is thus required to strive for neutrality in the distribution of public benefits; the solution is not to multiply
preferences, but to eliminate as many as possible. 17
III. RESPONSES TO PARTICULAR POINTS
In addition to engaging in fallacies in his response to A
ProgressiveReply, Professor Oppenheimer specifically attacks
certain portions of the arguments in that article. In response,
Part III addresses the following points: (1) the significance of
the Court's refusal to review the Ninth Circuit's Ruling; (2)
the majoritarian difficulty; (3) the use of narrative; (4) the
"two-pile" method as fiction; (5) the drop in University of California minority admissions; (6) the pay equity issue; and (7)
the outreach and aggressive recruiting programs.
A.

The Significance of the Court's Refusal to Review the
Ninth Circuit'sRuling

Professor Oppenheimer begins his critique of A Progressive Reply by noting that the Supreme Court's refusal to disturb the Ninth Circuit's ruling signifies nothing about the
Court's view of the merits of the case.88 Since it was a facial
challenge, he explains, the Court may be simply waiting for a
87. Carcieri, A ProgressiveReply, supra note 2, at 166-67.
88. See Oppenheimer, supra note 1, at 1158-59.
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more fully developed factual context to evaluate the equal
protection challenge of a Proposition 209-like reform.89
Though the Court has certainly accepted review of facial
challenges to state laws before, ° Professor Oppenheimer is
correct-strictly speaking, the Court's refusal to intervene is
not a statement of its views of the merits of the case. However, two observations are important on this point.
First, A Progressive Reply did not claim that the Court's
refusal to grant certiorari was an expression of its view of the
merits. Rather, that article indicated simply that it was not
surprising that the Court did not view the proposition as such
an obvious constitutional violation that it had to intervene.9'
Second, there is little serious doubt about the Court's decision
had it granted certiorari. One of the Court's legacies under
Chief Justice Rehnquist is a reassertion of the fundamental
principle of American constitutional democracy: federalism.
Apart from the Court's likely ruling on a claim of a right to
group preferences in the allocation of public benefits under
the Fourteenth Amendment in light of Adarand,9 Croson,9"
Wygant,9 ' and Bakke,"' the Rehnquist Court strongly favors
state sovereignty.96 Thus, those challenging Proposition 209
would properly have a heavy burden of persuasion based both
on this principle and another bedrock principle of modern
democracy to which we now turn.
B.

The MajoritarianDifficulty

Professor Oppenheimer fails to respond to my argument
concerning the significance of the majority rule in a democ-

89. See id. at 1156-59.

90. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Strauder v. West Virginia,
110 U.S. 303 (1879).

91. See Carcieri, A ProgressiveReply, supra note 2, at 142.
92. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
93. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
94. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
95. University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
96. I submit, in fact, that the ACLU is fortunate the Court did not grant review of its challenge to Proposition 209, as suggested by the decision of civil
rights groups to urge a settlement of Piscataway Township Bd. of Educ. v. Tax-

man, 522 U.S. 1010 (1997), in order to avoid the Court's resolution of the conflict. See Steven Holmes, Civil Rights Leaders Execute Retreat on Affirmative
Action, S.F. EXAMINER, Nov. 23, 1997, at A18. See generally Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706 (1999); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); City of Boerne
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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racy.
Certainly the majority will is not beyond judicial review,98 "the presumptive legitimacy of the majority's will is
the irreducible minimum of democracy in any form."99 This is
indisputable since otherwise society would have to establish
which minority is presumptively entitled to rule and why.
Rather than attempting to respond to the substance of this
point, however, Professor Oppenheimer simply quotes some
isolated statements I made and summarily concludes that
Judge Henderson, in a passage I quoted, effectively spoke to
me. 10
As I responded to Judge Henderson, however, his
statement "amounts to no more than a promise that the judge
will convincingly make the case that [Proposition 209] violates equal protection. Since, as I shall show, he does not do
so, he fails to overcome the presumption in favor of the majority's will."'0 1
Had the Supreme Court accepted review of the ACLU's
challenge, it would have engaged a presumption in favor of
the people's vote. While Professor Oppenheimer and the
ACLU claim that women and minorities have a constitutional
right to preferences, they refuse to acknowledge that one of
the most fundamental rights in a democracy is the right of
the people to self-government. °2 Apart from the merits of the
claim of group rights to preferences under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the majoritarian principle, in combination with
the Court's emphasis on federalism, would have likely resulted in the Court upholding Proposition 209.
C.

The Use of Narrative
Professor Oppenheimer notes that after questioning the
use of a narrative by another scholar," 3 A Progressive Reply
mentions that my many years as a college teacher involved
mentoring and writing references for students of many races
and both genders.!0 4 On this account, Oppenheimer seems to
think my article contradicts itself, but a fair reading of A Pro97. See Carcieri, A ProgressiveReply, supra note 2, at 144-48.
98. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
99. Carcieri, A ProgressiveReply, supra note 2, at 145.
100. See Oppenheimer, supra note 1, at 1160-61.
101. Carcieri, A ProgressiveReply, supra note 2, at 146 n.28.
102. See ROBERT DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 175 (1989).
103. See Oppenheimer, supra note 1, at 1169 (citing Carcieri, A Progressive
Reply, supra note 2, at 159-60).
104. See id. (citing Carcieri, A ProgressiveReply, supra note 2, at 179-80).
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gressive Reply shows that he is mistaken.
While A ProgressiveReply claimed that narratives cannot
' it states they
simply be substituted for legal argumentation, 1°
are "valuable in certain contexts."" 6 The point of stories regarding treating students based on their merits regardless of
race or gender is important. While affirmative action proponents expect professors to proceed by the rules of civil society
and ignore race or gender, they excuse themselves from adhering to the same rules. In reserving the right to apply preferences against individuals not in their favored groups, these
proponents assume that they can operate at the level of the
Hobbesian state of nature, where there is only war, even
though everyone else must operate according to principles of
liberal democracy. Use of a narrative in A Progressive Reply,
thus, is not an exercise in a contradiction, but rather serves to
identify the contradiction in proponents of affirmative action.
D. The "Two-Pile" Method as Fiction
Professor Oppenheimer saves his harshest criticism for
my reference to the "two-pile" method.0 7 "Under this practice,
applications for university teaching positions are sorted at
the outset of the selection process into a 'favored pile' for
women and people of color, and a 'disfavored pile', to be denied serious consideration, for white males."' Professor Oppenheimer claims that the two-pile method is a fiction because the article discussing the two-pile method relied on in A
Progressive Reply disclaims responsibility for its contents, insisting that the article simply showed up in Professor Paulsen's mailbox.0 9
First, A Progressive Reply made no claim that the twopile method is universally used in public university faculty
hiring. The article merely stated that "it is so widely known
to be used among public and private institutions that it is
openly discussed in the law journals.""0 Second, it strains

105. See Carcieri, A ProgressiveReply, supra note 2, at 160 n.76.
106. Id. at 160.
107. See id. at 149 n.35.
108. Id.
109. See id. (citing Michael Stokes Paulsen, Reverse Discriminationand Law
School Faculty Hiring: The Undiscovered Opinion, 71 TEX. L. REV. 993, 995
(1993)).
110. Id.
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credulity that Professor Paulsen "found" rather than wrote
the piece. However, it is clear why Professor Paulsen would
make such a claim: as a young faculty member at a prominent public law school, he could seriously risk his chance of
securing tenure if he recognized that such a blatantly unconstitutional process takes place. Most likely, Paulsen was
highlighting something that people know happens, but takes
place behind closed doors."1 Therefore, the two-pile method is
not subject to reliable measurement. In the same journal issue, in fact, Professor Delgado's response to Paulsen is literally an admission that the two-pile method is widely used
since it is effectively a statement against interest."2 Rather
than disputing the practice's existence, Delgado attempts to
justify it with broad generalizations about the link between
political views and race and gender."' Professor Oppenheimer claims that Delgado simply assumed the truth of
Paulsen's claims in order to critique its legal analysis,' but
Professor Oppenheimer's claims are unconvincing. If Professor Delgado felt that he could credibly challenge the existence
of the two-pile method, he would unquestionably have done
so. Rather, Delgado most likely knows of the system, and
simply put forth a non-persuasive attempt to justify it.
As suggested, a precise assessment of the two-pile
method's prevalence in public university faculty hiring is difficult because such a practice will, for obvious reasons, generally be kept secret. While Professor Oppenheimer did not
prove that the two-pile method is a fiction, no one can show
the scope of its use. However, an inside description of a faculty search cannot simply be dismissed as fiction. As Professor Kindrow wrote regarding faculty selection methods at his
university, "[1]ooking day after day at applications from hopeful Ph.D.'s, I began to develop moral qualms. Basically, I was
111. Several commentators have noted that the simultaneous enforcement
and denial of race and gender preferences demanded by the current system entails lying and hypocrisy on the part of public institutions. See Symposium, Is
Affirmative Action on the Way Out? Should it be?, COMMENTARY MAG., Mar.
1998, at 20, 23, 46, 52. As one symposium contributor remarked, "demanding
assent to the lie ... has been a feature of totalitarian rather than democratic
societies." Id. at 42.
112. See Richard Delgado, Five Months Later (The Trial Court Opinion), 71
TEX. L. REV. 1011 (1993).
113. See id. at 1016.
114. See Oppenheimer, supra note 1, at 1168.
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screening them for indications of race, not scholarship. It was
as simple as the two piles of applications on my desk: one for
Before
minority candidates, another for nonminorities.""'1
Proposition 209's passage, further, I interviewed faculty in
both the California State University and University of California systems. Both confirmed that in their experiences, the
first thing that happens when it is time to start narrowing
down the pool of applicants is the division of the applications
into two piles, one for white males, and one for everyone else,
just like Professor Paulsen describes." 6 Moreover, as the New
York Times recently reported, "University of New Hampshire
President Joan Leitzel recently promised to double the number of black faculty and quadruple the number of black students by 2006..." How President Leitzel plans to quadruple
the number of black faculty without the two-pile method,
which Professor Oppenheimer insists is a fiction, is a mystery.
Although the prevalence of the two-pile method in public
university faculty hiring is unknown, it certainly is not a fiction. Bakke, Hopwood,"' the recently dismissed University of
Georgia case,"' the pending University of Michigan cases,"'
pattern: colorand other recent lawsuits 2 ' illustrate a clear
coded, separate admissions processes exist.122 In short, the

115. G. Kindrow, The Candidate: Inside One Affirmative Action Search, in
DEBATING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 144 (1994) (emphasis added).

116. Telephone Interview with Michael Graham, Professor, California State
University (Mar. 8, 1997); Telephone Interview with Edward Erler, Professor,
California State University (Mar. 28, 1998); Telephone Interview with Tom
Schrock, Professor, University of California (May 12, 1997); Telephone Interview with Joel Clark, Professor, University of California (May 12, 1997). See
Paulsen, supra note 109, at 997. As I wrote in A ProgressiveReply, the two-pile
method "cannot possibly be used so that all applications for a position will be
given equal consideration, for then there would be no reason, and no one would
have thought, to separate them based on race and gender." Carcieri, A Progressive Reply, supra note 2, at 149 n.35.
117. Two New Hampshire Campuses Address Rise in Racial Tensions, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 30, 1998, at A18.
118. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
119. See Wooden v. Board of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 32 F. Supp. 2d
1370 (S.D. Ga. 1999).
120. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 1999); Gratz v. Bollinger, 183 F.R.D. 209 (E.D. Mich. 1998).
121. See Michael S. Greve, The Demise of Race-Based Admissions Policies,
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 19, 1999, at B6.

122. Indeed, an expert witness for the university in the Hopwood case attempted to justify the University of Texas Law School's practice by claiming
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two-pile method is not universal, rather only common, and
Professor Oppenheimer does not show otherwise. But here is
the final irony. Professor Oppenheimer admits that "the data
suggest that in academic hiring, race and gender preferences
have largely been eliminated." 2 ' If this is so, and the playing
field is as level for everyone as he suggests, how can he still
insist that women and minorities are constitutionally entitled
to preferences in the competition for such positions?
E.

The Drop in University of CaliforniaMinority Admissions

Professor Oppenheimer cites the drop in minority admissions to the undergraduate, law, and medical schools at the
University of California system the year after Proposition 209
took effect, and claims that minority students have "suffered
dramatically" as a result.1 24 This drop, however, was far more
dramatic at the University of California, Berkeley and UCLA
than at the other University of California campuses. 25 Even
more significantly, minority admissions have significantly rebounded at all University of California campuses for the
1999-2000 academic year. 126 Further, it is improper to suggest that minority students not accepted to the University of
California, Berkeley or UCLA because of the ending of race
preferences are "suffering dramatically" by having to attend
the University of California, Irvine or Riverside.
F. The Pay Equity
While listing the employment statistics from the Bureau
of Labor mentioned above,'27 Professor Oppenheimer cites
comparative salary figures suggesting pay inequity between
that "everyone is doing it." Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 576 n.72 (W.D.
Tex. 1994).
123. Oppenheimer, supra note 1, at 1172.
124. Id. at 1180.
125. See James Traub, The Class of Proposition 209, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May
2, 1999, at 44; University of California Points to Rebound in Admissions of Minority Undergraduates,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1999, at 18; Kenneth R. Weiss, UC
Sees Halt to Steep Drop in Minorities,L.A. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1999, at A3.
126. See Traub, supra note 125, at 46; see also A. Cohen, When the Field is
Level, TIME, July 5, 1999, at 32. A similar dynamic has taken place at the University of Texas in the wake of Hopwood. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932
(5th Cir. 1996); see also Dan Carnevale, Enrollment of Minority Freshmen Near
Pre-HopwoodLevels at U. of Texas at Austin, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 3,
1999, at A71.
127. See supra Part II.B.1.
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race and gender groups. 28 There are constitutional difficulties with using preferences against individuals based on what
is true of their race and gender groups. In this case, accordingly, the salary figures do not reflect what a given individual
within any of these groups earns. Even assuming that the
numbers cited are accurate,'29 it does not follow that race and
gender preferences in public employment are a legitimate
remedy for pay inequity. If there is pay inequity between
members of different groups performing the same job, the
remedy is pay equity, not the use of race and gender preferences against unemployed individuals.
G. The Outreachand Aggressive RecruitingPrograms
Professor Oppenheimer claims that weaker forms of affirmative action, such as outreach and aggressive recruiting
programs, as well as the power of public agencies to engage in
voluntary affirmative action, "are the very heart of what the
ACLU is attempting to save.""' This is hard to believe. The
California Ballot Pamphlet,"' Ms. Ripston's article,"' and the
attacks on Proposition 209 in the Hastings Constitutional
Law Quarterly symposium"' fail to indicate that these programs, and not preferences in the distribution of public benefits generally, were being defended. Rather, the ACLU was
fighting to keep race and gender preferences in place, the
electorate knew this, and chose against these preferences.
Professor Oppenheimer makes it sound like poor marketing
by the ACLU, rather than the substance of its position, led to
Proposition 209's enactment, but this in unconvincing. Nowhere in the California Ballot pamphlet, Ms. Ripston's article, or the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly symposium
128. See Oppenheimer, supra note 1, at 1171, 1175-76.
129. Mona Charen claims that after appropriate adjustments are made,
women earn 98% of what men earn. See Mona Charen, Pay Inequity is Figment
of Liberals'Imagination,FL. TIMES-UNION, Mar. 23, 1999, at B7.

130. Oppenheimer, supra note 1, at 1180. It is interesting that elsewhere in
his article Professor Oppenheimer downgrades the importance of such programs
to having been "in large part" what the ACLU was trying to protect, so it seems
that the ACLU itself was confused about what it was trying to salvage. See id.
at 1183.
131. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1494 (N.D.
Cal. 1996).
132. See Ripston, supra note 7, at 1.
133. See Symposium, The Meanings of Merit: Affirmative Action and Proposition 209, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 921 (1996).
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did affirmative action proponents indicate that it was only the
weaker forms of affirmative action that they were trying to
save.
IV. AREAS OF PARTIAL OR SUBSTANTIAL AGREEMENT
While the thrust of this essay is that Professor Oppenheimer failed to rebut the arguments made in A Progressive
Reply, there are specific issues with at least partial agreement.134 To clarify the issues and establish a foundation for
constructive dialogue and consensus, this essay concludes
with an assessment of these areas of partial or substantial
agreement.
A.

Outreachand Aggressive Recruiting
To begin, there is no dispute that the less coercive forms
of affirmative action generally pose no constitutional problems.'35 No thoughtful individual doubts the legitimacy, in
fact the vital importance, of vigorous enforcement of antidiscrimination laws. Beyond this, outreach to, and aggressive
recruiting of, targeted groups likewise generally poses no constitutional problems.'36
Properly administered, such programs expand the applicant pool for public benefits such as
education, employment, and contracts. Accordingly, there is
no Fourteenth Amendment violation in the allocation of public funds for the University of California to send its undergraduates to counsel and tutor minority high school students.'37 Although a race-conscious use of public resources,
such programs promote equal opportunity for admission to a
good university without dictating such an outcome.'38 Like134. See Oppenheimer, supra note 1, at 1179-83.
135. See id. at 1183-84.
136. See Carcieri, A ProgressiveReply, supra note 2 at 181-83; Martin Carcieri, OperationalNeed, PoliticalReality and Liberal Democracy: Two Suggested
Amendments to Proposition209-Based Reforms, 9 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 459,
461-62 (1999) [hereinafter Carcieri, OperationalNeed]. Even affirmative action
opponents like Robert Alt, Director of Public Relations and Education for the
Center for Individual Rights, agree. See Robert Alt, Toward Equal Protection:A
Review of Affirmative Action, 36 WASHBURN L.J. 179, 181 (1997). Though such
outreach and aggressive recruiting programs have their potential for abuse, I
agree with Professor Edley that vigorous enforcement of anti-discrimination law
is not enough. However, I tend to reject the conclusions he thinks can be drawn
from that premise. See EDLEY, supra note 29, ch. 4.
137. See Traub, supra note 125, at 46.
138. If Florida follows California and Washington's lead next year, such prac-
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wise, a policy of advertising public job openings or invitations
to bid on public contracts in publications targeted to minority
groups, as well as in mainstream publications, poses no constitutional difficulty. Again, such race-conscious advertising
functions to expand the applicant pool, yet does not involve
awarding the public benefit based on an applicant's skin
color. These practices are consistent with the liberal values of
a fair process for each applicant and an optimally competitive
market for scarce public resources. In these practices, any
race or gender consciousness occurs before the benefits are
allocated-in the pre-admission, pre-hiring, and pre-bidding
stages. Outreach and aggressive recruiting, thus, do not generally involve the use of race or gender preferences in the actual process of distributing public benefits.'39
Law Enforcement and CorrectionsEmployment Practices
Among stronger forms of affirmative action, quotas have
been found unconstitutional since Justice Powell rejected
them in Bakke. 4 9 At the same time, Powell upheld the use of
preferences, i.e., the bestowal of a "plus factor" for memberSince
ship in certain races, in public university admissions.'
how209,
Proposition
by
preferences are explicitly banned
ever, they are at the center of the current debate. Absent a
showing of discrimination by a particular governmental
agency, race or gender preferences in public employment generally violate equal protection.142 Some federal judges, including Judge Posner, indicate that under the "operational
need" doctrine,' temporary race preferences are relatively
defensible within a narrow sector of public employment,
namely law enforcement and corrections hiring and promoWhere the government demonstrates, by
tion practices.'
B.

tices may embody the future of the resolution of public affirmative action at the
state level. See id. at 45-46; Cohen, supra note 126, at 30.
139. Polls show that the majority of Americans oppose measures involving
the use of race or gender preferences. See Sam Howe Verhovek, Poll Finds Ambivalence Over Racial Preference, S.F. EXAMINER, Dec. 14, 1997, at A12.
140. See University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316-18 (1978).
141. See id.
142. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274-75 (1986).
143. The "political need" doctrine is "a law enforcement body's need to carry
out its mission effectively, with a workforce that appears unbiased, able to
communicate with the public, and is respected by the community it serves."
Barhold v. Rodriguez, 863 F.2d 233, 238 (2d Cir. 1988).
144. See Carcieri, OperationalNeed, supra note 136, at 466-76; cf. Wittmer
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clear and convincing evidence, that such preferences are necessary for the effective policing of specific neighborhoods or
the effective administration of specific correctional facilities,
courts could uphold such preferences against equal protection
attack on a principled basis. While not specifically addressed
in his response to A Progressive Reply, I assume Professor
Oppenheimer would have no objection to this use of the "operational need" doctrine.
C. Modest Race Preferencesin Public University Admissions
Under the Diversity Rationale
The "operational need" rationale is similar to a justification advanced for preferences in other contexts:1 45 the "political reality" doctrine.'46 Professor Russell Weintraub of the
University 7 of Texas Law School observed, in response to
14
Hopwood,
If the majority of people in this state are going to be Mexican-American and African-American, and they are going
to assume many of the leadership roles in the state, then
it's going to be big trouble if the law school doesn't admit
many minority students-it's going to be a bomb ready to
explode. 48
This statement implies that the risk of serious violence,
which justifies race preferences in the law enforcement and
corrections contexts, also justifies them in the law school admissions context. However, threats of violence cannot be a
routine basis for constitutional interpretation in a democracy,
v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996); Barhold, 863 F.2d at 233; Talbert v. City
of Richmond, 648 F.2d 925 (4th Cir. 1981); Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v.
Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979).
145. See Carcieri, OperationalNeed, supra note 136, at 484-87.
146. See id. at 484-500.
147. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
148. James Traub, Testing Texas, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 6, 1998, at 20. As the
authors of the Piscatawaybrief have written,
if affirmative action is ended, inevitable political, economic, and legal
forces will pressure the great public universities to lower admissions
standards as far as necessary to avoid re-segregation. Barring a miraculous improvement in elementary and secondary education for minority students, color blind admissions will soon produce either public
universities without competitive admissions, without adequate funds,
or both.
Brief of Charles Alan Wright et al. as Amici Curiae, Piscataway Township
Board of Educ. v. Taxman, 522 U.S. 1010 (1997).
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a cornerstone of which is an independent judiciary. Public
universities should not operate on principles applicable to
prisons. In the university context, as opposed to law enforcement and corrections,
we are no longer in the criminal realm, at the threshold of
the Hobbesian state of nature, where we must take our
bearings primarily from human fear, ignorance, and
greed. Rather... we may rely on the human capacities
for reason, compromise, and adherence to the rule of lawdemocratic citizenship. Those who do not prevail in court
but who prefer allegiance to democracy may be expected to
limit themselves to civil forms of resistance.'4 9
Thus, the use of race preferences in the public university admissions context under the "political reality" rationale is not
constitutional.'5 °
At the same time, modest"' race preferences in public
university admissions might pass constitutional muster under the diversity rationale recognized by Justice Powell in
153
federal courts,
Bakke. 5' In spite of the recent views of some
Justice Powell basically got it right: diversity is a fundamental principle of liberal education, embraced in various ways by
149. Carcieri, OperationalNeed, supra note 136, at 490-91.
150. See id. at 487-500.
151. The meaning of "modest" can obviously not be pinned down with precision, though the amici curiae brief in Piscataway defines it as one standard deviation. See Brief of Wright et al., supra note 148, at 17. Another definition is
"limited in extent or aim." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY

1452 (3d ed. 1993).
152. See University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-15 (1978).
In effect, Justice Powell ruled that public university admissions must accommodate the twin liberal principles of (1) diversity, and (2) the individual locus of
equal protection. As a guideline for making this accommodation, he indicated
that race could be "one factor among many" which public university admissions
officers may take into account. Id. The problem, of course, as has been exposed
in the Hopwood litigation and recent inquiries under state Freedom of Information Acts, is that race has been not simply one factor among many, but rather a
primary factor in admissions to selective public universities. This has been reflected in the separate track, color-coded admissions processes, and SAT score
gaps of 200 points, in fact nearly 300 points, between successful black and white
applicants at some public universities. See Alt, supra note 136, at 187-88; Michael Lynch, Affirmative Action at the University of California, 11 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB.POLY 139, 148 (1997); Stephan & Abigail Thernstrom, Racial Preferences: What We Now Know, COMMENTARY MAG., Feb. 1999, at 45-46.
Even Bok and Bowen's figures reflect this. See BOK & BOWEN, supra note 29, at
21-23.
153. See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 945 (5th Cir. 1996); Wessmann
v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 796-800 (1st Cir. 1998).
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Madison, 5 4 Mill, 55 and Dewey. 15 6 Diversity is closely related

to the social and political toleration at the heart of classical
liberalism.'57 Though there may be problems of narrow tailoring where race preferences are employed as a means to advance diversity, I agree that promotion of diversity among a
public university student body is a compelling state inter"'
est. 58
If the Supreme Court grants review of one of the
pending challenges to the use of race preferences in the context of public education, as in the University of Michigan liti154. "An acquaintance with ... the globe we inhabit, the nations among
which it is divided, and the characters and customs which distinguish them...
never fails in uncorrupted minds to weaken local prejudices and enlarge the
sphere of benevolent feelings." Letter from James Madison to Samuel S. Lewis
(February 16, 1829), in LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 280
(Rives & Fendall eds., 1884). At the same time, I must admit that I have not
seen it proven that it is necessary, for a student to successfully study a foreign
culture, that members of that culture matriculate at his university.
155. For Mill, liberal education is "directed ...to a broad development of understanding over the widest possible area of knowledge; . . . it is an education
concerned not so much with factual acquisition as with the quality of experience, with truth, not dogma, with discovery in intellectual exploration and the
release of individual potential."
F. GARFORTH, JOHN STUART MILL ON
EDUCATION 18 (1971).
156. See, e.g., JOHN DEwEY, THE POLITICAL WRITINGS, ch. IV (Debra Morris
& Ian Shapiro eds., 1993).
157. See David Smith, Liberalism, in 9 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 276 (1968).

158. Since I agree that diversity could satisfy the ends prong of strict scrutiny, I find plausible the recent arguments by leading liberal scholars that the
Court would, on the right facts, uphold modest race preferences under the
authority of Powell's Bakke opinion. See Amar & Katyal, supra note 36, at
1745; Dworkin, supra note 36, at 56; Rosen, supra note 36, at 24. Still, there
are at least two problems.
First, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy disapproved of the diversity rationale in the broadcasting context. See Metro Broad. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 612
(1989). More recently, lower federal courts have been skeptical of this rationale.
See Eisenberg v. Montgomery, 197 F.3d 123, 130 (4th Cir. 1999); Wessmann v.
Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 797-800 (1st Cir. 1998); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932,
944 (5th Cir. 1996). Though Amar and Katyal ably distinguish the educational
context from the broadcasting and contracting contexts, this will still be an uphill battle. See Amar & Katyal, supra note 36.
Second, states attempting to defend their race preferences in admissions
under the diversity rationale will have difficulty with the means prong of strict
scrutiny: even if we stipulate that diversity is a compelling state interest, it is
highly questionable whether race preferences, especially as currently employed,
are narrowly tailored to advance that interest. In my estimation, they are unquestionably underinclusive and, depending on how Bakke diversity is characterized, arguably overinclusive as well. See generally Martin Carcieri, The
Wages of Taking Bakke Seriously (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
author).
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gation"9 it may resolve this conflict permanently.
V.

CONCLUSION

Professor Oppenheimer suggests that by titling my article a "progressive reply," I hijack a noble word. 6 ° The assumption seems to be that being progressive and disagreeing
with the ACLU is impossible. This raises the question of
whether it is the continuation or the extinction of race-based
differential treatment by the government that constitutes
progress. The civil rights movement initially characterized
progress in the latter way, holding that no individual should
be held back based on immutable, accidental traits of race.
That idea gave the movement its great moral authority and
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 its moral foundation."'
So I could be clever and say that Professor Oppenheimer
really is a conservative since he seeks to conserve governmental preferences based on immutable traits, attempting in
principle to extend the regime of Jim Crow. But he is no
more a conservative than I am, and even if we do not agree on
means, at least we substantially agree on ends. It may unfortunately just be that there is an impasse on some of the major
issues in this debate, that the two sides simply cannot hear
each other. Still, we have a duty to keep having a constructive dialogue, as this is at the heart of democratic citizenship.

159. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 183 F.R.D. 209 (E.D. Mich. 1998).
160. See Oppenheimer, supra note 1, at 1186.
161. See PAUL CRAIG ROBERTS & LAWRENCE STRATTON, THE NEW COLOR
LINE: How QUOTAS AND PRIVILEGE DESTROY DEMOCRACY ch. 1 (1995); Morris

Abram, Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers and Social Engineers, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 1312, 1312-13 (1986); Gregory Rodriguez, Has the Civil Rights Movement
Become Too Inclusive?, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1998, at M2.

